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THE NEW WTO TUNA DOLPHIN DECISION: 
RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT?
Vanda Jakir*
Summary: The WTO is often criticised for consistently refusing to 
accept the environmental measures of its Members due to their adver-
se impacts on international trade. The aim of this paper is to examine 
the recent developments in WTO law considering this clash between 
liberal trade and environmental protection. The analysis is based on 
the most recent US – Tuna II (Mexico)1 case, the third in the Tuna Do-
lphin line of case law. The paper shows that the Appellate Body still 
greatly favours free trade over the environment, but that some pro-
gress can still be found in the latest Tuna ruling. Notions of technical 
regulation, likeness, less favourable treatment, extraterritoriality and 
necessity are examined in light of this dispute. The paper also gives 
a broader perspective on the suitability of the Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement to endorse environmental protection in the form of 
‘green trade barriers’, as well as suggestions for a new approach that 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should take in an effort to strike a 
balance between protecting the environment and facilitating economic 
prosperity through liberal trade.
1. Introduction
‘The Earth is one, but the world is not.’2
Dating back from as early as 1987, this quotation still perfectly de-
picts the status of environmental protection in the world today. On the 
one hand, the need to respond to environmental concerns on a global le-
vel has become increasingly pertinent in recent years, while on the other 
hand, global solutions are hard to find when some other interests besides 
environmental protection come into play. One such interest is often the 
maintenance of economic prosperity in the form of trade liberalisation. 
The arena in which environmental protection frequently clashes with free 
trade, especially given its heterogeneity, is the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). However, from the perspective of environmental protection, the 
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1  United States - Measures concerning the importation, marketing and sale of tuna and 
tuna products, WT/DS381/R.
2 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987) 27.
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results are far from satisfactory. The WTO has been repeatedly critici-
sed for pursuing trade liberalisation while sacrificing the environment, 
human health or animal welfare,3  and has even been referred to as the 
‘GATT-zilla trade monster’.4 
In the WTO arena, the interplay of trade and the environment can of-
ten be found in so-called ‘green trade barriers’.5 For example, one country 
adopts a (high) environmental standard which certain products should 
meet and then makes compliance with those standards a condition for 
foreign products to access its market. In effect, the environmental stan-
dards of the regulating country are thus also applied outside its territory, 
in the exporting country. A spill-over effect would here be most desirable, 
but unfortunately it often happens that powerful and wealthy countries 
impose their own vision of appropriate environmental protection, usually 
setting the bar too high for less developed countries. In this way, the phe-
nomenon of ‘eco-imperialism’6 is created, leaving less developed countries 
out of trade relations and thus decreasing their chances of prospering 
economically, which then further perpetuates their inability to bear the 
costs of high(er) environmental protection.
The aim of this paper is to examine recent developments in addre-
ssing the antagonism between environmental protection and trade libe-
ralisation in the WTO. This will be done by analysing the most recent 
ruling in the Tuna Dolphin saga – US-Tuna II (Mexico), 7,8 preceded by the 
first US-Tuna I (Mexico)9 case and the second US-Tuna (EEC)10 case. The-
se three cases form a perfect ground for such an analysis. The facts of 
all three cases involve a US ‘green trade barrier’ aimed at protecting the 
dolphin population by introducing certain requirements that tuna pro-
ducts, domestic or foreign, have to meet with regard to safety to dolphins. 
The cases are also interesting for the EU, not only because it was one of 
the parties in the second case, but also because comparable tensions 
3 W Zhou, ‘US-Clove Cigarettes and US-Tuna II (Mexico): Implications for the Role of Regu-
latory Purpose under Article III:4 of the GATT’ (2012) 15(4) JIEL 1076.
4 Used in, eg, JH Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence of 
Conflict?” (1992) 49 Washington & Lee Law Review 1235.
5 JL Dunoff, ‘Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: 
Can We Prosper and Protect?’ (1992) 49 Washington & Lee Law Review 1407.
6 ibid 1241.
7 Panel report, United States - Measures concerning the importation, marketing and sale 
of tuna and tuna products (15 September 2011) WT/DS381/R.
8 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures concerning the importation, marketing 
and sale of tuna and tuna products (16 May 2012) WT/DS381/AB/R.
9 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 3 September 1991, 
unadopted, BISD 39S/155 (hereinafter US – Tuna I (Mexico)).
10 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 16 June 1994, 
unadopted, DS29/R444 (hereinafter US – Tuna II (EEC)).
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exist in the EU as well.11 Furthermore, it will be interesting to see how 
the approach of the Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) in these cases de-
veloped as regards the conflict between trade and environment and how 
the parties adapted their policies to the (un)responsiveness of WTO dis-
pute settlement to environmental concerns. The paper will focus on the 
most recent US-Tuna II (Mexico) case in order to determine whether the 
WTO is at least on the way to striking a fine balance between endorsing 
environmental protection while maintaining free trade relations. This will 
prove to be a very rewarding exercise as the most recent Tuna case, unli-
ke its predecessors, involves the application of the Agreement on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
In order to fully address the issue at hand, this paper will first give a 
brief outline of the first two Tuna cases (Part 2). After dealing extensively 
with all the issues raised by the most imminent US – Tuna II (Mexico) in 
Part 3, the paper will turn to examine how the TBT Agreement responds 
to the trade – environment conflict (Part 4). Part 5 will take a more general 
perspective and analyse possible approaches to tackle the antagonism at 
issue. Finally, concluding remarks will be presented in Part 6.
2. Setting the scene: the road to US-Tuna II (Mexico)
2.1. US – Tuna I (Mexico) 
The US – Tuna I (Mexico)12 dispute revolves around the US Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).13 This piece of legislation was introduced 
in the US in order to tackle the issue of dolphin mortality related to tuna 
fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).14 In that part of the 
ocean, unlike in other parts, tuna and dolphins tend to travel together – 
the dolphins stay on the surface of the ocean, while schools of tuna swim 
underneath.15 Therefore, the presence of dolphins serves as a strong in-
dicator to fishermen that tuna is there as well. The fishermen then circle 
the tuna along with the dolphins with purse seine nets.16 Even though 
the dolphins are not the prey of the fishermen, they end up getting cau-
ght in the nets and dragged to the fishing boat, usually not surviving this 
ordeal.17 As will become relevant further in the development of the Tuna 
cases and in this paper, it should be noted that unlike US vessels which 
11 N de Sadeleer, ‘Trade v Environment in EU law’ – Collection of papers <http://www.
tradevenvironment.eu/working-papers/> accessed 9 September 2013.
12  US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9).
13 F Macmillan, WTO and the Environment (Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 70.
14 ibid 71.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
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fish elsewhere in the ocean, the Mexican tuna boats fish almost exclusi-
vely in the ETP, where the tuna-dolphin association is present.
In order to prevent such incidental killings of dolphins, the MMPA 
introduced a general prohibition of the ‘taking’ (harassment, hunting, cap-
ture, killing or attempt thereof) of marine mammals, including dolphins, 
except when explicitly authorised by means of a permit.18 At the time of 
this dispute, the American Tuna Boat Association was the only holder of 
such a permit, which set a limit of 20,500 incidental dolphin kills per ye-
ar.19 As to imported tuna, certain trade restrictions were imposed, which 
became the core of this Tuna dispute. Firstly, the importation of tuna and 
tuna products was banned if tuna was caught in a way which involved 
the incidental killing of marine mammals in excess of the US standards.20 
The only way imported tuna (products) could access the US market was 
to demonstrate that the average national rate of the incidental taking of 
marine mammals in the country where the fishing vessel was registered 
did not exceed the average US rate by more than 1.25 times in the same 
time period.21 Secondly, embargoes on tuna products were introduced not 
only against states which did not demonstrate conformity with the afore-
mentioned provisions,22 but also against intermediary nations unless they 
showed they had also embargoed the directly embargoed nation.23 Thirdly, 
the US President could use his discretionary power to impose a total ban 
on all fishing products from directly or indirectly embargoed nations six 
months after the introduction of the embargo.24 Lastly, a labelling regime 
was established under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act 
(DPCIA).25 The ‘dolphin-safe’ label could be used on tuna products marke-
ted in the US for which documentary evidence was provided that tuna was 
not harvested by intentionally setting on dolphins with purse seine nets.26 
As one of the directly embargoed nations, Mexico decided to chall-
enge the US provisions under the GATT. It claimed that the US violated 
Article I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), Article III (National 
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Article XI (General Eli-
mination of Quantitative Restrictions) and Article XIII (Non-discrimina-
tory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions), and that no justificati-
on could be found under Article XX (General Exceptions) of the GATT.27 
18 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [2.3].
19 Macmillan (n 13) 71.
20 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [2.5].
21 ibid [2.6].
22 ibid [2.7].
23 ibid [2.10].
24 ibid [2.9].
25 ibid [2.12].
26 Macmillan (n 13) 112.
27 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [3.1]-[3.5].
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The Panel took the view that the ban on tuna products should be 
considered under Article XI:1 and not under Article III:4 because the 
MMPA did not regulate tuna products as such, nor did it prescribe special 
fishing techniques, but was aimed at preventing the taking of dolphins 
in the course of harvesting tuna.28 Therefore, the provisions in question 
were to be considered as quantitative restrictions to import and not as 
internal regulations.29
The real battle started in considering the possibility of justifying the 
US measures under Article XX (b) on the protection of animal life and (g) 
on the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, as argued by the 
US.30 The debate under Article XX in this dispute reflects one of the most 
contentious issues in the whole of the Tuna saga, and that is the issue 
of extraterritoriality. Should the US be allowed to impose standards of 
environmental protection which in effect do not give a choice to Mexico 
as to their application if it wants to maintain trade relations? The Panel’s 
reply was a clear-cut ‘no’ – Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions are not availa-
ble to preserve animal life or natural resources outside the jurisdiction of 
the country invoking the exception.31 The Panel supported its conclusion 
with the now famous ‘reasonableness argument’32 – if Article XX excepti-
ons were available in such cases, any Member could unilaterally impose 
their own environmental policies that other countries would not be able 
to disregard without jeopardising their rights under the GATT.33 
The Panel further considered an alternative scenario. Even if the US 
could invoke the GATT exceptions for unilateral measures, the measures 
would still have to be necessary for achieving the set aim, as required 
by Article XX (b).34 The Panel referred to the meaning of ‘necessary’ as 
laid down in Thai Cigarettes35 according to which a measure is necessary 
only if another reasonably available GATT consistent measure could not 
be applied.36 According to the Panel, a measure satisfying this criterion 
would be to conclude a bilateral agreement on dolphin protection.37 The 
Panel then went on to conclude that the US measure related to ‘unpre-
28 ibid [5.10].
29 ibid [5.18].
30 ibid [5.22].
31 ibid [5.27].
32 A Rosas, ‘Non-commercial Values and the World Trade System: Building on Article XX’ 
in K Van der Borght (ed), Essays on the Future of the WTO: Finding a New Balance (Cameron 
May 2003) 75, 82.
33 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [5.27].
34 ibid [5.28].
35 GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Ciga-
rettes (7 November 1990) 37S/200, DS10/R BISD 29th Supp 200 (1991).
36 ibid [74].
37 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [5.28].
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dictable conditions’ because Mexico could not have been aware of the US 
average dolphin killing rate and thus it was unable to adapt its own ra-
te.38 How the latter exactly related to the conditions set in Thai Cigarettes 
remained a mystery.39
As to the labelling under DPCIA, the Panel very easily concluded 
that it was in line with the GATT. It considered that the labelling scheme 
did not breach Article I:1 (Most Favoured Nation) because it did not put 
Mexico at any disadvantage compared to other countries.40 In itself, the 
labelling scheme did not restrict the sale of tuna in any way, as tuna 
could be marketed freely without the ‘dolphin-friendly’ label.41 On top of 
that, no discrimination based on the country of origin was made, as the 
DPCIA applied to all tuna caught in the ETP, regardless of the country 
in which the vessel catching the tuna was registered.42 The decision of 
the Panel on the labelling scheme might seem of secondary importance 
in this case, but it will turn out to be quite valuable in the analysis of the 
most recent Tuna case.43
As an interim conclusion, it is no wonder that the first Tuna deci-
sion was not welcomed by environmentalists,44 as it quite clearly opted 
for endorsing trade liberalisation by condemning almost all of the US 
measures, rather than opening up at least a niche for environmental 
protection. Given especially the narrow construction of Article XX and a 
straightforward refusal of extraterritoriality, it was inconceivable that any 
‘green barrier’ would pass such a strict test.
2.2. US – Tuna II (EEC)
The second case in the Tuna trio – US – Tuna II (EEC)45 – basically 
involves the same set of facts as the first one, with the exception of the 
complainants, which were in this case the EEC and The Netherlands, 
both under the intermediary nation embargo.46 In relation to the Panel’s 
finding in the previous case on the possibility to conclude international 
agreements on dolphin protection as a less trade-restrictive alternative, 
it is worth mentioning that in between the two disputes, the countries 
which were the members of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commissi-
38 ibid. 
39 Macmillan (n 13) 73.
40 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [5.42].
41 ibid.
42 ibid [5.43].
43 See Part 4 of this paper.
44 Sea Turtle Restoration Project, ‘WTO vs. Democracy” <http://seaturtles.org/article.
php?id=70> accessed 20 April 2013.
45 US – Tuna II (EEC) (n 10).
46 Macmillan (n 13) 74.
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on (IATTC), including the US and Mexico, signed the ‘La Jolla Agreement’47 
aimed at gradually reducing dolphin mortality in the ETP.48 However, the 
EEC and The Netherlands were not members of the Commission, which 
explains how this dispute came into place.49
The Panel in the EEC case followed much the same approach as the 
Panel in the US – Tuna I (Mexico) case. As in the previous case, it conclu-
ded that the embargoes were not in line with Article XI:1.50 However, it 
was in relation to Article XX (b) and (g) that a slight difference is visible. 
The Panel stated that the text of Article XX does not a priori exclude the 
extraterritorial application of environmental protection policies.51 After 
letting out this little ray of sunshine for the environment, the Panel then 
turned to the already familiar ‘reasonableness’ argument52 and further 
added that if other Members were forced to change their policies, the 
balance of rights and obligations between contracting parties, especially 
when it comes to market access, would be seriously impaired.53 Besides 
the almost obiter dictum as regards Article XX, the Panel maintained all 
of its conclusions from the previous Tuna dispute,54 while the labelling 
scheme was not at all challenged by the complainants. 
Regardless of the slightly nuanced approach of the Panel in Tuna II, 
the outcome was the same as in the previous dispute – in short, the US 
measures were found to be contrary to the GATT. One could still interpret 
this report as the Panel softening its approach by admitting that the bare 
text of the GATT does not a priori exclude extraterritoriality. However, it 
could also be argued that this reasoning was implicit in the previous dis-
pute and that the Panel was simply more careful in its reasoning, given 
the strong reactions of environmental groups. 
3. The most recent US – Tuna II (Mexico) ruling
3.1. Summary of the dispute 
3.1.1. Background and the contested measures
With both of the previous Tuna Panel reports left unadopted, the US 
and Mexico managed to (temporarily) settle the issue through negotia-
47 La Jolla Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 
(21 April 1992, La Jolla, California).
48 Macmillan (n 13) 74.
49 ibid.
50 US – Tuna II (EEC) (n 10) [5.10].
51 ibid [5.25].
52 ibid [5.26].
53 ibid .
54 ibid [6.1]
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ting the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program 
(AIDCP) in 1999 under the auspices of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission (IATTC).55 The AIDCP sets out a labelling scheme – a ‘do-
lphin-friendly’ label is allowed to be carried by products for which it was 
shown that there was ‘no significant adverse impact’ on dolphin morta-
lity.56  This standard is obviously far less stringent than the US DPCIA 
standard, which requires evidence to be shown that fishermen were not 
intentionally setting on dolphins to catch tuna.57 After scientific research, 
the US Department of Commerce concluded that the AIDCP standard is 
suitable for the US aims.58 However, this conclusion was subsequently 
overturned in Earth Island v Hogarth59  – a case brought by an envi-
ronmentalist NGO against the US Secretary of Commerce. Consequently, 
the US never adopted the AIDCP standard, while its own more stringent 
DPCIA standard remained in place.60 This is precisely the reason why 
Mexico initiated the third dispute in the Tuna saga.61
The DPCIA prescribes a set of rules that have to be observed by fis-
hermen in order for a tuna product to carry the ‘dolphin-safe’ label. There 
are five categories of circumstances in which tuna can be caught.62 These 
categories are established by using the criteria of the location of the fishi-
ng (inside or outside the ETP), the fishing gear used (purse seine nets or 
other equipment), the presence or absence of tuna-dolphin interaction in 
the form of joint travel in the fishing areas concerned, as well as the level 
of dolphin casualties or injuries.63 In short, for most of the categories, the 
DPCIA requires written statements of vessels’ captains and independent 
observers that no dolphins were killed or injured during the harvest and/
or that no purse seine nets were used to encircle dolphins in the course of 
the harvesting voyage.64 Mexico challenged the DPCIA and the way it was 
implemented, as well as the Earth Island v Hogarth ruling.65 As a novelty 
in comparison to the first two cases, Mexico challenged the US measures 
not only under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, but also under Articles 
2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.66 The following part of this paper 
55 E Trujillo, ‘The Tuna-Dolphin Encore – WTO Rules on Environmental Labelling’ (7 March 
2012) 16(7) ASIL <http://www.asil.org/insights120307.cfm> accessed 23 April 2013.
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Earth Island Institute v Hogarth, 
484 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2007).
60 Trujillo (n 55). 
61 ibid.
62 Panel report, US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 7) [5.43].
63 ibid. 
64 ibid, see table, 7-8.
65 ibid [2.1].
66 ibid [3.1].
151CYELP 9 [2013] 143-176
will only briefly outline the conclusions of the Panel and the AB in this 
case.
3.1.2. Summary of the Panel findings 
The Panel firstly observed the measures under the TBT Agreement,67 
as this agreement is considered, in relation to the GATT, as ‘dealing in 
detail, and specifically’ with the matters that it covers.68 
Mexico claimed in respect of compliance with the relevant TBT pro-
visions that the US measures were a discriminatory and unnecessary 
technical regulation.69 The Panel agreed that this does constitute a tech-
nical regulation since compliance with the measure is mandatory in the 
sense of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement which gives a definition of a 
technical regulation.70 As technical regulations, unlike standards, must 
comply with the requirements of Article 2, it then continued its analysis 
under Article 2.1 and concluded that Mexican and US tuna should be 
considered as ‘like products’ but that Mexican (or any other foreign) tuna 
was not afforded treatment less favourable in relation to US (domestic) 
products since the dolphin-safe label does not distinguish tuna products 
based on the country of origin.71 However, in respect of Article 2.2, the 
Panel found that the US measures were more trade-restrictive than ne-
cessary to achieve the legitimate objectives of ensuring that consumers 
are not misled and of protecting the dolphin population.72 In examining 
the measures under Article 2.4, the Panel referred to the AIDCP stan-
dard and concluded that it was a relevant international standard73 for 
the measures in question, but not appropriate or effective to achieve their 
objectives.74 As to the GATT, in exercising judicial economy, the Panel 
refrained from ruling on Mexico’s claims in that respect.75
Therefore, according to the Panel, the US failed to fulfil its obligati-
ons under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. 
67 ibid [7.46].
68 ibid [7.43].
69 United States – Measure Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products, DS381, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.
htm>  accessed 24 April 2013.
70 Panel report, US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 7) [7.145].
71 ibid [7.374].
72 ibid [7.620]-[7.621].
73 ibid [7.702].
74 ibid [7.730].
75 ibid [7.748].
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3.1.3. Summary of the AB findings 
Both the US and Mexico were not satisfied with the report of the Pa-
nel. The US challenged the Panel’s finding that the measures in question 
should be deemed as technical regulations,76 as well as the conclusion 
that they were more trade restrictive than necessary,77 while also clai-
ming that the AIDCP standard should not be considered as a relevant 
international standard.78 Mexico, on the other hand, urged the AB to up-
hold the findings which the US had appealed.79 It further requested the 
AIDCP standard to be found appropriate and efficient,80 while adding that 
the dispute should be considered under the GATT as well.81 
Before overruling some of the Panel’s findings, the AB firstly con-
firmed that the measures in question should be considered a technical 
regulation.82 It then parted from the Panel by stating that the measure 
was inconsistent with Article 2.1 as it was in fact discriminatory because 
Mexican tuna, unlike US or other tuna, was mostly excluded from acce-
ssing the ‘dolphin-safe’ label.83 It also reversed the Panel regarding the 
necessity of the measure, by concluding that alternative measures could 
not be considered as equivalent, thus exonerating the US from the Article 
2.2 breach.84 As to the last issue on international standards under Article 
2.4, the AB did not disagree with the Panel on the lack of suitability of the 
AIDCP standard,85 but added that new parties could accede to the AIDCP 
only by invitation, which means that the AIDCP should not have been 
considered as a ‘relevant international standard’.86
Now that the main consideration of the Panel and the AB in US – 
Tuna II (Mexico) have been outlined, the following section will examine 
them in detail, while putting the thus generated conclusions into the 
specific context of the conflict between trade and the environment. 
3.2. The technical regulation/standard distinction
The TBT Agreement distinguishes between technical regulations and 
standards in that technical regulations must be necessary to achieve the 
76 AB Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 8) [11].
77 ibid [19].
78 ibid [30].
79 ibid [46], [56], [72].
80 ibid [100].
81 ibid [108].
82 ibid [199].
83 ibid [299]. 
84 ibid [333].
85 ibid [400].
86 ibid [399].
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legitimate aim that they pursue,87 while they are applied in a non-discri-
minatory manner88 and are preferably based on international standards, 
if relevant international standards exist in a given case.89 For the pur-
poses of distinguishing technical regulations from standards, both are 
defined in Annex 1 of the TBT. After comparing the two definitions in the 
context of the dispute in question, it becomes clear that both a techni-
cal regulation and a standard lay down product characteristics or their 
process and production methods, which can also include labelling.90 The 
difference rests in the fact that compliance with a technical regulation is 
mandatory, while with a standard it is not.91 There is also case law on this 
issue – for example, in EC – Sardines92 the AB considered that there are 
three criteria that must be satisfied in order for a measure to be identified 
as a technical regulation. Firstly, it must apply to an identifiable product; 
secondly, it should lay down one or more characteristics of that product; 
and, thirdly, compliance with these characteristics must be mandatory.93
Both the Panel and the AB in US – Tuna II (Mexico) concluded that 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ label under the DPCIA was in fact a technical regu-
lation.94  However, if the given arguments are carefully analysed, their 
conclusions seem quite puzzling.
When it comes to the three criteria set out above, it is quite clear that 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling system under the DPCIA applies to tuna as 
an identifiable product and that it lays down a product characteristic of 
being harvested in a dolphin-friendly manner. Therefore, the issue which 
remains unresolved here is whether the labelling system should be consi-
dered as mandatory. As the US argued, if a certain tuna product does not 
comply with the requirements prescribed to carry the ‘dolphin-safe’ label, 
it can still be freely marketed in the US without such a label. Therefore, 
and along the lines of a separate opinion95 of one of the panellists in US – 
Tuna II (Mexico), the decision to comply is ‘voluntary and discretionary’.96 
The question is, then, how and why the Panel and the AB came to the 
conclusion that compliance with the DPCIA is mandatory?
87 Article 2.2 TBT.
88 Article 2.1 TBT.
89 Article 2.4 TBT.
90 Annex 1.1 and 1.2 TBT.
91 ibid.
92 AB Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (26 September 2002) 
WT/DS231/AB/R 
93 ibid [7.25]-[7.30].
94 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel report (n 7) [4.274]; US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 7) 
[199].
95 US – -Tuna II (Mexico), Panel report (n 7) [7.152]-[7.153].
96 ibid [7.153].
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It must be underlined that the AB’s considerations appear to be con-
tradictory in these terms – ‘[t]o us, the mere fact that there is no require-
ment to use a particular label in order to place a product for sale on the 
market does not preclude a finding that a measure constitutes a techni-
cal regulation […]’,97 ie that it should be considered mandatory. In further 
developing this argument, the AB extensively relied on EC – Sardines,98 
where a product could be marketed under the name of ‘preserved sar-
dines’ only if one particular species of sardines was contained therein, 
while products containing all other species could still be marketed wit-
hout the ‘preserved sardines’ appellation.99 In that case, the measure was 
deemed to be a technical regulation, which led the AB to conclude in this 
case that the existence of a possibility to legally market a product under 
a different label does not in itself exclude the measure from the scope of 
a technical regulation.100  
However, if the technical regulation/standard distinction as envisa-
ged in the TBT is to be maintained, such an interpretation seems hard 
to apply. The meaning of the notion ‘technical regulation’ is in this case 
interpreted in such broad terms that it simply does not leave room for 
a substantial definition of the term ‘standard’. If this interpretation is 
accepted, then any legal possibility to use a certain label is to be conside-
red as a technical regulation, even though a market operator cannot be 
forced to comply with its provisions. 
In the context of the treatment of ‘green barriers’ under the WTO, 
this consideration in fact puts a burden on any Member wishing to pur-
sue an environmental policy objective. It is only natural that Member 
States try to push for greater environmental protection by introducing 
trade measures in a non-compulsory manner, so that they would avoid 
excessive costs on market operators which are not competitive enough to 
bear them. However, after US – Tuna II (Mexico), it seems that even such 
measures cannot escape scrutiny under Article 2 of the TBT. 
It should further be noted that both the Panel and the AB empha-
sised in their reports that the DPCIA also prescribes sanctions against 
operators which claim their tuna product to be ‘dolphin-safe’ while not 
meeting the DPCIA requirements to carry such a label.101 This finding 
was used as additional support for the argument on the mandatory cha-
racter of the label in question.102 However, as Mavroidis points out, even 
97 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 89) [196]. 
98 EC –  Sardines (n 92).
99 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [198].
100 ibid.
101 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel report (n 7) [7.142]; US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) 
[140].
102 ibid.
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standards need enforcement: ‘if [they] can be used by products that fall 
short of meeting the established statutory requirements, then they ipso 
facto are denied of any raison d’être’.103 
In relation to the previous argument, the AB also noted that it 
attaches great significance to the fact that if a tuna product does not 
meet the DPCIA requirements, a market operator cannot make any ‘do-
lphin-safe’ claim.104 Does this mean the AB would come to a different 
conclusion if another label, other than ‘dolphin-safe’, could be used in-
stead? If this was the message the AB was trying to convey, it is in order 
to analyse the consequences of such a conclusion. 
In the course of a tuna harvest, dolphins are either harmed or they 
are not, and so a product is either dolphin-safe or it is not. Consequently, 
the way in which the absence of harm to dolphins is ensured is what 
would distinguish different labels. Therefore, the outcome of the tech-
nical regulation/standard question might have been different if the US 
recognised the possibility of carrying the ‘dolphin-safe’ label for products 
which comply with requirements that achieve the same effect as the DP-
CIA when it comes to dolphin safety. In the context of reconciling trade 
objectives with environmental protection, perhaps such a conclusion is 
not that senseless after all. It follows from the above that if the DPCIA 
was designed in this way, it would have to be considered voluntary, and 
therefore a standard escaping scrutiny under Article 2 of the TBT. In this 
way, environmental policies would be endorsed, while still offering a wide 
range of possibilities for the market operators. This can also serve to 
explain why the AB considered the DPCIA label as mandatory – because 
no other dolphin-safe label was allowed.
Even though there are objections to the reasoning of the Panel and 
the AB regarding the technical regulation/standard distinction, the mere 
fact that they chose to consider the DPCIA as a technical regulation does 
not necessarily mean the battle is lost for environmental protection. It 
could be argued that this was actually a policy choice, and that the Panel 
and the AB wanted to make a statement about Article 2 of the TBT in re-
lation to the trade vs environment conflict, which this dispute embodies. 
How this was done will be dealt with in the following parts of this paper. 
3.3. Like products and the ‘PPM distinction’ 
 It should be recalled that Article 2.1 of the TBT agreement prescri-
bes that treatment no less favourable than that accorded to products of 
103 P Mavroidis, ‘Driftin’ Too Far from Shore (Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT 
Agreement Developed by the WTO Appellate Body is Wrong, and What Should the AB Have 
Done Instead)’ (2013) I WTR 21 (emphasis added).
104 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [196].
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national origin should be accorded to ‘like’ products from other countries. 
Determining ‘likeness’ comes as a first step in the analysis of the confor-
mity of the US dolphin-safe labelling scheme with this Article.
In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel held that US and Mexican tuna 
should be considered as ‘like’ products.105 It came to this conclusion by 
applying the criteria for determining ‘likeness’ set forth in EC- Asbestos.106 
The analysis there involved determining:
 (i) the physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the 
products are capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) the 
extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as alter-
native means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a 
particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification 
of the products for tariff purposes.107  
The Panel concluded that the products in question satisfy all of the-
se criteria, and they should, therefore, be considered as ‘like’ products.108 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this assertion. It is noticea-
ble that the products compared here as to their ‘likeness’ are all US tuna 
products and all Mexican tuna products, regardless of whether they are 
‘dolphin-safe’ or not. Therefore, the ‘PPM distinction’, ie differentiating 
between products based on their process and production method, has 
not been taken into account. This conclusion does not come as a surprise 
since the issue of the relevance of PPMs has not yet been fully settled in 
WTO case law. For example, in the first Tuna dispute,109 the Panel consi-
dered that PPMs were irrelevant in determining the ‘likeness’ of products, 
while in EC –  Asbestos110 and Chile – Alcohol111 the conclusion was that 
they still might be taken into account. Of course, the inclusion of PPMs 
in determining the ‘likeness’ of products is an issue that does not relate 
only to disputes where trade and environment are in conflict, but in fact 
reflects an issue in the overall approach in WTO case law. Therefore, an 
attempt to assess PPMs in that context would perhaps go beyond the 
scope of this paper. Still, it is worth analysing it in the context of the US 
–Tuna II (Mexico) alone. 
 
105 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel report (n 7) [7.251].
106 AB report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Contai-
ning Products, (12 March 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R [102].
107 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel report (n 7) [7.235].
108 ibid [7.251].
109 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [5.15].
110 EC – Asbestos (n 104) [101]-[102].
111 AB Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (13 December 1999) WT/DS87/AB/R,
WT/DS110/AB/R [46].
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As stated above, the Panel compared all US and all Mexican tuna 
products as to their ‘likeness’.112 In fact, since most US tuna products are 
considered as ‘dolphin-safe’ because they carry the label, the comparison 
was actually made between domestic ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna products and 
imported tuna products, regardless of their safety to dolphins. In this 
respect, Mavroidis argues that the Panel should have compared dome-
stic ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna products with the imported ‘dolphin-safe’ pro-
ducts, which would then allow the Panel to consider if those two groups 
of products, which pursue the same objective, are treated as required by 
Article 2.1, ie whether there is less favourable treatment of imported ‘do-
lphin-safe’ tuna on the basis of its origin. It is beyond doubt that such an 
approach would definitely favour environmental protection over liberal 
trade, as the US legislation allows any product meeting the DPCIA requi-
rements to carry the ‘dolphin-safe’ label, regardless of its origin or the ori-
gin of the vessel which caught the tuna. However, this kind of approach 
would completely miss the point of this dispute – the question is not 
whether there is discrimination between products that have already acce-
ssed the label, but whether the access itself is discriminatory in relation 
to the origin of the products. In other words, the issue lies in determining 
whether the requirements imposed by the DPCIA for access to the label 
constitute a legitimate (non-discriminatory) environmental policy choice. 
Of course, the possible differences in treatment of domestic and impor-
ted ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna products are not a nugatory issue. However, that 
debate can be dealt with only after determining whether the DPCIA could 
have been introduced in the first place. 
Another issue that the Panel dealt with in greater detail relates to 
the perception of US consumers of tuna products concerning their safety 
to dolphins. As a third party, it was the EU which argued that consu-
mer perception and preferences in this respect might have an impact 
in determining whether the products in question are ‘like’.113 The Panel 
acknowledged that US consumers indeed to a certain extent distinguish 
between ‘dolphin-safe’ and ‘dolphin-unsafe’ tuna products, but in doing 
so, they do not distinguish the products as to their origin.114 Moreover, if 
the Panel accepted that consumer perception in this respect is relevant, 
that would mean that Mexican tuna products are, in the eyes of consu-
mers, a priori considered as ‘dolphin-unsafe’, which cannot in any way be 
concluded from the facts of the case.115 Therefore, consumer preference 
in this case does not have an impact on determining the ‘likeness’ of the 
products. This assertion is in fact in accordance with what had previo-
112 Mavroidis, ‘Driftin’ Too Far from Shore’ (n 103) 15-16.
113 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel report  (n 7) [7.248].
114 ibid [7.249].
115 ibid [7.250].
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usly been said about the groups of products compared – all US and all 
Mexican tuna products and how this kind of approach enables the Panel 
to conclude if the labelling scheme could have been introduced in the 
first place. 
Still, one might argue that consumer perception is relevant for that 
matter as well. If consumers already distinguish between ‘dolphin-safe’ 
and ‘dolphin-unsafe’ tuna products, why did the US government have to 
regulate consumer behaviour in the first place, when consumers are alre-
ady acting in line with the government’s policy of favouring ‘dolphin-safe’ 
over ‘dolphin-unsafe’ products?116 At first glance, this argument seems 
plausible, but only to the extent that it does not take into consideration 
the fact that ‘dolphin-unsafe’ products are still allowed on the US market, 
only without the label. In other words, it follows that the US introduced 
the DPCIA label in order to inform the consumers about which products 
are ‘dolphin-safe’, so that they can accordingly exercise their previously 
developed preference for ‘dolphin-safe’ products. It would be completely 
different if the US had banned ‘dolphin-unsafe’ tuna products from the 
market (as it did in the previous Tuna cases) because, given the already 
developed consumer preference, there would be no need to correct consu-
mer behaviour in forcing them to buy only ‘dolphin-safe’ products. 
In conclusion, even though not including the PPM distinction in de-
termining ‘likeness’ might be considered as opting for an ‘environmen-
tally unfriendly’ approach, this does not seem to be the case in US – Tuna 
II (Mexico). Given the fact that none of the parties appealed on this point 
and that the AB consequently did not address the issue of ‘likeness’, it 
is actually the determination of ‘less favourable treatment’ that is more 
relevant for resolving the conflict between free trade and environmental 
protection.
3.4. ‘Less favourable treatment’  
After determining that the US and the Mexican tuna products are to 
be considered as ‘like’, the next step under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agree-
ment is to determine if imported ‘like’ products are treated less favoura-
bly than domestic ‘like’ products. It must be underlined that the conclu-
sion of the Panel and the AB differ greatly in this respect. They will be 
examined in turn.
The Panel concluded that there is no less favourable treatment of 
Mexican tuna products in the case at hand.117 It relied on the AB ruling 
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef118 in finding that the analysis should 
116 Mavroidis ‘Driftin’ Too Far from Shore’ (n 103) 11.
117 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.378].
118 AB Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (10 
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rely on the treatment afforded by the measures themselves, rather than 
on the consequences that arise due to other factors unrelated to the me-
asure itself.119 In other words, the Panel concluded that the US and the 
Mexican tuna products are indeed in different positions on the market, 
as most US tuna products carry the ‘dolphin-safe’ label, while the Mexi-
can ones do not.120 However, this is not a result of the measure itself, 
because the measure applies origin-neutral criteria and allows all tuna 
products to access the label if they meet the prescribed requirements.121 
Therefore, the potential adverse impact that the Mexican tuna products 
are experiencing on the US market as a result of not carrying the ‘do-
lphin-safe’ label is not related to the nationality of the product, but to the 
‘fishing and purchasing practices, geographical location, relative integra-
tion of different segments of production, and economic and marketing 
choices’.122 To put it simply, the reason why Mexican tuna products are in 
a less advantageous position in the US market is connected to the choice 
of Mexican fishing fleets not to abandon the fishing technique of setting 
on dolphins.123
Unfortunately from an environmentalists’ point of view, the AB re-
versed124 this finding of the Panel. On a preliminary note, it underlined 
that ‘treatment no less favourable’ should not be determined on the basis 
of whether imported products have access to an advantage on the mar-
ket – in this case, that would be the ‘dolphin-safe’ label – but whether 
‘the contested measure modifies the conditions of competition to the de-
triment of imported products’.125 It firstly concluded that carrying the 
‘dolphin-safe’ label is indeed an advantage in the US market because 
consumers tend to buy those products more.126 Therefore, it is the go-
vernmental action in the form of the labelling scheme that has modified 
the conditions of competition in the market to the detriment of Mexican 
tuna products.127 Hence, the detrimental impact to Mexican products is 
indeed a consequence of the measure itself.128
 However, this alone does not automatically render the measure in 
violation of Article 2.1; it should further be analysed ‘whether the detri-
January 2011) WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R [149].
119 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.334].
120 ibid [7.376].
121 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.378].
122 ibid.
123 ibid.
124 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [297].
125 ibid [221].
126 ibid [233].
127 ibid [239].
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mental impact reflects discrimination’.129 The following part of the AB ruling 
is hard to understand and it can be stated without exaggeration that it re-
presents the most contentious finding in its report. The AB concluded that 
while the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling scheme fully addresses dolphin mortality 
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) as a result of setting on dolphins, it 
does not address mortality in other parts of the ocean resulting from other 
fishing methods.130 Therefore, the DPCIA is not ‘calibrated’ to the risks 
that different fishing methods impose in different areas of the ocean and 
the US failed to demonstrate that the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna 
products ‘stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction’.131 
A couple of remarks are in order. 
On the one hand, the finding that discrimination is present, which 
was the point of this AB exercise, does not flow effortlessly from the fin-
ding that the DPCIA was not ‘calibrated’ to the risks imposed. This con-
sideration of the AB dwells more on the fact that the measure is inconsi-
stent rather than discriminatory. Of course, consistency could have been 
an issue if the US measure treated the products differently based on their 
origin – that would have been a clear-cut case of discrimination, but this 
simply does not follow from the facts of the case. From the viewpoint of 
environmental protection, this conclusion is far from satisfactory. A ‘gre-
en barrier’ once again failed to pass the ‘WTO test’.
On the other hand, things might not be as dark for the environment 
as they seem. Argumentum a contrario to what had been stated by the 
AB, if the US had calibrated the risks, the measure would not have been 
found in violation of Article 2.1. In other words, the US labelling scheme 
should have included strict requirements not only for tuna caught inside 
the ETP, but for tuna caught outside the ETP as well in order to remedy 
the discrimination. The AB even seems to have given a hint on how this 
could be done.132 It suggested that certification from an independent ob-
server that no dolphins were harmed during a fishing voyage outside the 
ETP would be sufficient, for example by simply asking the captain of the 
vessel to provide the relevant document.133 This suggestion of the AB is 
quite striking as it would not contribute to trade liberalisation. In other 
words, if this suggestion is indeed implemented, the US market would 
not open up for Mexican tuna products. Nothing would change for Mexico 
129 ibid [240].
130 ibid [297].
131 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [297].
132 J Pauwelyn, ‘Tuna: The End of the PPM distinction? The Rise of International Standar-
ds?’ (International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 22 May 2012) < http://worldtradelaw.
typepad.com/ielpblog/2012/05/tuna-the-end-of-the-ppm-distinction-the-rise-of-interna-
tional-standards.html>  accessed 21 April 2013.
133 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [296], [297].  See also Pauwelyn (n 132).
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as an ETP fishing nation, while other nations fishing outside the ETP (the 
US included) would have to deal with the stricter requirements.
It can be concluded from the above that the AB in fact implicitly 
opted for environmental protection. Even though the US measure failed 
to pass its scrutiny, there are obviously ways to rectify the contravention 
while still protecting the dolphins, in fact even to a greater extent, rather 
than loosening the labelling requirements in favour of free trade. Never-
theless, one cannot help but wonder what would happen if the US indeed 
‘calibrated’ the measure. Mexico would have to deal with greater costs 
of dolphin-friendly tuna fishing, which it might or might not be able to 
support. This shows that perhaps opting for either trade or environment 
in fact is not the answer. However, since in WTO dispute settlement a 
measure is either upheld or is not, considering a solution which does 
neither could lead to reconsidering the overall approach to trade mea-
sures, which would overstep the boundaries of this paper. 
A further consideration that arises here is whether such a ‘calibrated 
measure’ would be found WTO compliant in the end. This hypothetical 
question that reveals new perspectives on the conflict between trade libe-
ralisation and environmental protection will be dealt with in Part 4 of this 
paper.134 But before going into that, the remainder of the Panel’s and AB’s 
findings in US –Tuna II (Mexico) still needs to be addressed. The following 
part deals with one of the crucial issues for this debate – the application 
of (US) environmental policies outside its jurisdiction (Mexico).
3.5. Extraterritorial application of environmental policies
Before going into the details of US – Tuna II (Mexico) regarding this 
issue, it should be recalled that in the previous Tuna disputes, the questi-
on of unilaterally imposing environmental policies which results in their 
application outside the territory of the regulating country was raised in 
relation to Article XX of the GATT and its (un)availability for use to justify 
such measures. In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the extraterritoriality issue was 
treated slightly differently than in the previous Tuna cases, given the TBT 
context as well as the jurisprudence developed in the meantime.
In the proceedings before the Panel, Mexico was obviously hoping 
to push the debate135 in the direction of the so-called ‘reasonablene-
ss’136 or ‘slippery-slope’137 argument, which was the turning point in the 
first two Tuna cases. As already stated above, the Panel’s ‘all-or-nothing 
134 Part 4.2 of this paper.
135 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [4.189]-[4.198].
136 Rosas (n 32) 82.
137 R Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline 
for the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 CJEL 507.
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approach’138 in those two cases basically relied on the consideration that 
if contracting parties were allowed to unilaterally impose environmental 
policies outside their jurisdiction, other contracting parties could not de-
viate from the set requirements without jeopardising their rights under 
the GATT.139 Moreover, the GATT would cease to be a multilateral trade 
framework, as legal certainty in respect of trade would only be maintai-
ned between countries with the same internal regulation.140
This conclusion has, however, been modified in between the second 
and the most recent Tuna case only in relation to Article XX of the GATT. 
The controversial AB report in US – Shrimp141 introduced a very bold sta-
tement regarding this issue. Given that the AB was heavily criticised at 
the time, as some considered that it should have left the matter to be 
settled through negotiation rather than litigation,142 the famous para-
graph 121 deserves to be cited in full:
It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries 
compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies (although covered in 
principle by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the im-
porting country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification 
under Article XX.  Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of 
the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the 
principles of interpretation we are bound to apply.143
When it comes to protecting the environment under the WTO, this 
finding certainly goes in its favour. Not only because the ‘reasonableness’ 
argument seems to have been dropped, but also because the AB impli-
citly recognised that, given the difficulties in reaching a consensus in 
international negotiations on environmental agreements,  some leeway 
should still be given to countries with environmentally friendly policies. 
After all, any measure that makes use of Article XX may require a change 
of policy in exporting countries, but that is inherent to the fact that it is 
an exception to the general rules.144 Therefore, the ‘reasonableness’ argu-
ment indeed renders the use of Article XX devoid of its purpose. 
In the subsequent cases, namely US – Shrimp II,145 the AB confirmed 
that the extraterritorial application of unilaterally adopted environmen-
138 Dunoff (n 5) 1416.
139 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9) [5.27]
140 ibid.
141 AB Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R.
142 Howse (n 137) 17.
143 US – Shrimp (n 141)[121].
144 N Notaro, Judicial Approaches to Trade and Environment – The EC and the WTO (Came-
ron May 2003) 191.
145 AB report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(22 October 2011) WT/DS58/AB/RW.
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tal policy measures is justifiable under Article XX,146 but it added that 
the adoption of such measures must be preceded by ‘serious negotiating 
efforts’.147 To a certain extent, this finding cast doubt as to whether pa-
ragraph 121 from the first US – Shrimp148 case can still be considered as 
a matter of principle. That is why US – Tuna II (Mexico) is all the more 
important, as it laid down a suitable set of facts that would once again 
invoke this issue. The only difference is that in US – Tuna II (Mexico) the 
extraterritoriality problem had to be solved not in the context of only Ar-
ticle XX of the GATT, but also in the context of the TBT. The TBT, howe-
ver, had never been discussed in this respect before.
In addressing the issue of extraterritoriality, the Panel in US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) firstly reiterated the AB in US – Shrimp I and quoted the famous 
paragraph 121 word for word.149 It then easily concluded that the same 
principle applied to Article 2.1 of the TBT as well.150 Up to this point, 
it seems that the possibility to justify extraterritorially applicable envi-
ronmental policies is recognised as a fully fledged principle. Moreover, 
this principle goes beyond the GATT and covers the TBT too.
However, the Panel then noted that the US labelling scheme does 
not require another Member State to comply with any particular fishing 
method, but that it is the products themselves that need to comply with 
the requirements of the labelling scheme,151 thus ensuring that the US 
market is not used as an incentive to fleets to harvest tuna by setting 
on dolphins.152 The second part of this statement on the aim of the me-
asure might be welcomed by environmentalists as additional support to 
extraterritoriality on behalf of the Panel, but it is the first part that seems 
somewhat worrying. In other words, one could argue that the conclusion 
of the Panel in fact poses certain limits: because the US measures are 
aimed at the products and not the policies of other Member States, it is 
possible to justify unilateralism. Perhaps the Panel’s conclusion would 
have been the exact opposite if the measures actually prescribed that no 
tuna may be imported if it comes from a country where tuna is caught 
by setting on dolphins,153 thus ‘forcing’ that country to change its policy 
if it wanted to maintain trade relations in respect of tuna products. This, 
however, would raise the issue of discrimination between ‘dolphin-frien-
dly’ and ‘dolphin-unfriendly’ countries in the sense of Article 2.1 of the 
TBT and the Most Favoured Nation principle set forth therein. 
146 ibid [123]-[124].
147 ibid. 
148 US – Shrimp (n 141).
149 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.371].
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After a detailed analysis of the Panel’s findings, it is worth noting 
that the AB did not refer to the issue of extraterritoriality in its report, 
despite Mexico’s efforts to steer the discussion in this respect.154 
In the end, the Panel’s findings can still be seen as a step forward 
in recognising ‘green barriers’ under the WTO. Perhaps the greatest no-
velty is that the TBT Agreement is apparently also covered by the US – 
Shrimp155 doctrine, despite all the possible limitations that might exist, 
including the fact that it has not yet been confirmed by the AB. Besides, 
this is not where the debate ends. The following part of this paper will 
treat the necessity requirements under Article 2.2 of the TBT, as applied 
in US – Tuna II (Mexico).
3.6. The ‘necessity’ test
It should be recalled that Article 2.2 of the TBT stipulates that ‘tech-
nical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment 
would create’. It then gives an open-ended list of objectives deemed le-
gitimate, including the prevention of deceptive practices, protection of 
animal life and the environment. 
In its report, the Panel concluded that the US measure followed a 
twofold objective. Firstly, the ‘consumer information objective’ which aims 
at ‘ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether 
tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely 
affects dolphins’,156 and secondly, the ‘dolphin protection objective’ which 
seeks to ‘contribute to the protection of dolphins, by ensuring that the US 
market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner 
that adversely affects dolphins’.157 Then, the Panel quite easily concluded 
that these objectives are to be considered as ‘legitimate’ because they fall 
under the broader goals of preventing deceptive practices and protecting 
animal life or health or the environment, both of which are listed in Ar-
ticle 2.2 of the TBT.158
As to whether the measure is more trade-restrictive than necessary, 
the Panel examined if there was a reasonably available alternative mea-
sure which was less trade-restrictive but still achieved the set objectives 
at the same level.159 As an alternative measure, Mexico suggested the 
coexistence of both the US ‘dolphin-safe’ label and the AIDCP label which 
154 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [61], [86], [n 675].
155 US – Shrimp (n 141).
156 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.401], [7.413],
157 ibid [7.401], [7.425].
158 ibid [7.437].
159 ibid [7.465].
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prescribes less stringent requirements for obtaining it.160 It is interesting 
to note here that the following assessment of the Panel was subsequently 
used by the AB in determining whether there was ‘less favourable tre-
atment’ under Article 2.1.161 Basically, the Panel concluded that since the 
US DPCIA label does not take into account adverse effects on dolphins 
outside the ETP, it only partially meets the pursued objectives.162 On the 
other hand, the proposed alternative to use the AIDCP label achieves the 
set objectives at the same level, to the extent that it does not create any 
additional adverse impact on dolphins or any additional ambiguity as to 
consumer information.163 
As has already been mentioned, the AIDCP is less stringent compa-
red to the US scheme under the DPCIA.164 Therefore, the Panel’s conclu-
sion simply cannot stand. The AB came to the same result – it is true 
that outside the ETP there is no difference between the US scheme and 
the AIDCP;165 however, as for tuna caught inside the ETP, the AIDCP is 
obviously not as strict as the DPCIA, so both the consumer information 
and dolphin protection objectives would be achieved to a lesser degree.166 
Therefore, the US scheme is not more trade restrictive than necessary 
within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT.167
It could be argued that these findings, taken on their own, do not 
bear significant relevance for the overall conflict between free trade and 
environmental protection in the WTO arena, as they are more or less con-
fined to the specific facts of this case. However, they will turn out to be 
very useful in assessing later in this paper the possibilities of adopting a 
new general approach in the WTO towards the reconciliation of free trade 
and environmental interests.168 
In any event, it is worth noting that the AB, even if as an obiter 
dictum, noted that a Member State is allowed to achieve the legitima-
te objectives ‘at the levels it considers appropriate’,169 which obviously 
includes high levels of protection of the environment. If this assertion 
is read in conjunction with the AB’s suggestion on how the US should 
‘calibrate’ its measures to avoid discrimination, it becomes at least per-
ceivable that a ‘green barrier’ could be allowed under the usually trade-
160 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.577], [7.578].
161 Part 3.4 of this paper.
162 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.599], [7.615].
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164 See Part 3.1.1 of this paper.
165 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [329].
166 ibid [330].
167 ibid [333].
168 Part 5 of this paper.
169 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [316].
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oriented WTO rules. Whether this is indeed so and whether it is a result 
of the application of the TBT instead of the GATT will be examined in the 
following part of this paper.
4. The TBT instead of the GATT – any change for the environment? 
As the previous parts of this paper have shown, there are quite a few 
differences between the most recent US – Tuna II (Mexico) and the pre-
vious two Tuna case. One of them, which has not yet been addressed in 
this paper, reflects a fundamentally different approach of the Panel to the 
case at hand, also followed by the AB. In US – Tuna II (Mexico) the mea-
sures at issue were analysed under the TBT Agreement and not under the 
GATT as the previous ones were. This is a consequence of two considera-
tions. First of all, at the time of the two previous Tuna disputes the TBT 
had not yet entered into force.170 Second, it follows from EC – Asbestos171 
that a measure should firstly be examined in light of the TBT since that 
agreement deals ‘specifically and in greater detail’ with technical barriers 
to trade.172 Only if a measure is found to be TBT consistent is further 
analysis under the GATT in order.173 Since the measure in US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) was considered to be in violation of the TBT, the Panel exercised 
judicial economy and refrained from deciding the matter on the GATT.174 
Considering that US – Tuna II (Mexico) turned out to be the most 
‘environmentally friendly’ of all Tuna cases, it can be argued that it was 
the application of the TBT instead of the GATT that opened up a niche for 
the recognition of ‘green barriers’ to trade. In this respect, it is in order to 
assess how the specific design and structure of the TBT adapts to striking 
a balance between environmental protection and economic prosperity de-
riving from free trade. 
4.1. The suitability of the TBT to tackle ‘green barriers’ to trade 
First of all, the TBT Agreement promotes international standardisa-
tion.175 Members are obliged to use international standards as a basis for 
their technical regulations and are allowed to depart from them only ‘when 
such international standards […] would be an ineffective or inappropria-
170 The date of the entry into force of the TBT Agreement is 1 January 1995.
171 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Con-
taining Products, (18 September 2000) WT/DS135/R.
172 ibid [8.16].
173 P Van den Bossche, D. Prévost, M. Matthee, ‘WTO Rules on Technical Barriers to Trade’ 
(2005/6) Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Papers 14.
174 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.748].
175 P Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and the Other WTO Agreements Regulating Trade 
in Goods (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 670.
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te means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued’,176 as 
required by Article 2.4. Therefore, in order to avoid violations of the TBT, 
Members are, at least in theory, inclined to engage in negotiations in 
order to find common accord with other Members as to the introduction 
and use of a particular international standard. Of course, the relevance 
of this feature of the TBT is less visible in the course of WTO litigation, 
when the usual course of action is to determine whether the departure 
from international standards is in line with the already discussed Articles 
2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT. As is visible from the previous parts of this paper, 
an example of such a case is the here treated US – Tuna II (Mexico) where 
the largest portion of legal analysis bore on Articles 2.1 and 2.2, while 
it was stated at the very end that the AIDCP standard would not be an 
appropriate tool to achieve the set objectives.177 Even though US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) is probably not a good example of successful international stan-
dardisation, it is worth noting that the US and Mexico still made an effort 
to try and find a solution by means of an international agreement aimed 
at protecting an environmental value. Of course, this might have been a 
result of their previous litigation under the GATT concerning the same 
issue.178 Still, as an overall observation, international standardisation is 
a useful tool to tackle cross-border environmental protection and the TBT 
certainly endorses such a tool. 
Secondly, the TBT Agreement has a different focus from that of the 
GATT,179 which enables it to address environmental policies more com-
prehensively. In the TBT, consumers’ perceptions are immaterial be-
cause the TBT applies once a Member State decides to regulate certain 
products180 in order to steer consumer behaviour towards its legitimate 
policy objectives. Therefore, a legitimate objective has already been iden-
tified and applied before the TBT ‘kicks in’.181 This feature of the TBT is 
quite useful as it avoids unnecessary hurdles in determining the ‘likene-
ss’ of products vis-à-vis their process and production method that is not 
reflected in the physical characteristic of the product (‘unincorporated 
PPMs’182). Although this issue has never been settled in a Panel or AB 
report, the very design of the TBT provisions indicates that it regula-
tes unincorporated PPMs as well because at least some of the legitimate 
176 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement (emphasis added).
177 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [7.740]; US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) 
[401].
178 US – Tuna I (Mexico) (n 9); US – Tuna (EEC) (n 10).
179 Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (n 175) 691.
180 ibid.
181 ibid.
182 World Trade Organisation, “Environment: Issues – Labelling” <http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/tratop_e/envir_e/labelling_e.htm> accessed 23 April 2013.
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objectives listed in Article 2.2 could not be achieved by other means.183 
One of these objectives is certainly environmental protection, and US – 
Tuna II (Mexico) serves here as a perfect example. One might argue then 
that it would be more favourable for Members’ environmental policies to 
leave unincorporated PPMs outside the scope of the TBT. However, the 
point of the exercise is not to opt for environmental protection no matter 
what, but to try and find a balance between environmental protection 
and free trade. In this respect, the TBT in fact endorses striking such a 
balance, since, at least in theory, it allows environmental policies to ‘sur-
vive’ the test under Articles 2.1 and 2.2, especially by taking into account 
the risks that non-application of these policies would create.184 
However, US – Tuna II (Mexico) shows that passing the scrutiny of the 
Panel and the AB under the TBT is not at all an easy task, which brings 
us to the next consideration.
The TBT can in fact be considered ‘stricter’ than the GATT.185 The 
TBT is more burdensome for regulators because they have to comply with 
an additional requirement which goes beyond non-discrimination, which 
is the necessity requirement.186 From the perspective of ‘green barriers’, 
even under the GATT the necessity requirement comes into play in a 
very particular case – that of Article XX (b), under which a regulator is 
allowed to deviate from the non-discrimination provisions if the measure 
is ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’. In other 
words, a measure under the GATT can be discriminatory but still pass 
the necessity test under the justifications part. However, it should be 
noted that the ‘rule-exception’ relationship which Article XX has with the 
non-discrimination obligations under the GATT is not replicated in the 
TBT Agreement.187 Under the latter, it seems that a measure must pass 
both the non-discrimination test under Article 2.1 and the necessity test 
under 2.2.188 Consequently, regulators bear a heavier burden in bringing 
their ‘green barriers’ in line with the TBT, which might also provoke a 
certain ‘chilling effect’ on potential regulators, as opposed to a situation 
where the regulations are subject only to the GATT.189
All in all, it seems that the TBT Agreement does not entail a substan-
tially more favourable environment for ‘green barriers’. Only with respect 
to PPMs does it offer a more comprehensive analysis of their compliance 
with WTO obligations, which does not necessarily mean that it is thus 
183 Commentary of R Howse in Pauwelyn (n 132).
184 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
185 Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (n 175) 671.
186 ibid.
187 Van den Bossche, Prévost, Matthee (n 173)16.
188 Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (n 175) 671.
189 ibid.
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more conducive for justifying ‘green barriers’, especially given the already 
mentioned extra-burden in the form of the compulsory necessity test. 
Nevertheless, regardless of all these considerations, even if a ‘green 
barrier’ is found to be TBT-compliant, it follows from EC – Asbestos190 and 
EC – Sardines191 that it would still have to be examined under the GATT. 
Therefore, to the extent that the TBT is not treated as a substitute to the 
GATT, a TBT-compliant ‘green barrier’, or any measure for that matter, 
must be GATT-compliant as well.
This conclusion opens a new discussion. It is recalled from Part 3.6 
of this paper that in US –Tuna II (Mexico) the AB suggested that a more 
‘calibrated’ US ‘dolphin-safe’ label would be in line with the TBT. In other 
words, if the label had addressed the risks for dolphins outside the ETP, 
it would not have been found in violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT. In 
line with what was previously said about the relationship between the 
TBT and the GATT, such a hypothetical measure would have to be found 
GATT-compliant if it were to be lawfully maintained. Of course, it can 
only be presumed that the US will try to follow this suggestion of the AB. 
Still, if the developments in the trade vs environment conflict brought 
by US – Tuna II (Mexico) are to be fully addressed, an analysis of this 
hypothetical, ‘calibrated’ label under the GATT is in order. If it is possible 
for such a measure to pass scrutiny under the GATT, it can be concluded 
that there is hope for ‘green barriers’ under the WTO. 
4.2. A glimpse into the future – the ‘calibrated’ label under the 
GATT
The hypothetical measure to be examined is a ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling 
scheme which imposes requirements on fleets as to the methods used 
and the harm caused to dolphins, regardless of their country of origin, 
which harvest tuna both inside the ETP, where a dolphin-tuna associati-
on is present to a high degree, and outside the ETP, where such an asso-
ciation exists only to a lesser degree. Following Mexico’s claims in US – 
Tuna II (Mexico), this hypothetical measure will be examined under GATT 
Articles I:1 and III:4.192 These Articles basically stipulate an obligation 
not to discriminate among imported like products based on their origin 
(Most Favoured Nation) as well as not to discriminate against imported 
like products so as to afford protection (National Treatment). 
Surprisingly, whether the hypothetical measure was in line with the-
se GATT provisions was in fact already answered in the first US – Tuna I 
(Mexico) dispute, albeit implicitly. It should be recalled that even in this 
190 EC – Asbestos (n 171) [8.16].
191 EC – Sardines (n 92) [313].
192 US – Tuna II (Mexico), Panel Report (n 7) [3.1].
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first Tuna case, the ‘non-calibrated’ DPCIA labelling system was in place 
and the Panel quite easily concluded that it did not violate the GATT since 
in affording the label it did not distinguish products as to their origin (!). 
However, in order to fully analyse this issue, it should further be 
considered whether the hypothetical measure could be considered as 
protectionist.193 In order to examine this, the findings of the Panel in US 
– Tuna II (Mexico) seem to be quite useful. The Panel concluded that the 
US fleets fish mostly outside the ETP, while Mexico fishes mostly inside 
the ETP. If the labelling scheme is not ‘calibrated’ as suggested by the AB, 
the requirements for obtaining the label for tuna caught outside the ETP 
are far less stringent than for tuna caught inside the ETP. This could be 
considered as an indication of a protectionist intention of the US becau-
se US fleets are thus de facto in a more advantageous position than the 
Mexican fleets. On the contrary, this argument could not be used against 
the hypothetical ‘calibrated’ labelling scheme, because the ‘calibrated’ la-
bel would address the risks for dolphins outside the ETP as well, thus 
imposing more stringent requirements for the US fleet too. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the hypothetical ‘calibrated’ me-
asure would be considered as consistent with the relevant provisions of 
the GATT. Given that the TBT is considered to entail a greater burden for 
regulators, as argued in the previous part of this paper,194 this conclusion 
is not surprising. 
As an overall conclusion to Part 4, US – Tuna II (Mexico) and the 
further points of analysis it raised show that the TBT is not particularly 
more favourable for ‘green barriers’ than the GATT. It is more likely that 
the opposite is true, but that could be argued in relation to any measu-
re, regardless of whether it follows an environmental policy or not. Still, 
it should be acknowledged that the AB in US – Tuna II (Mexico) turned 
out to be more ‘environmentally friendly’ than the Panel in the previous 
Tuna disputes, especially by hinting to the US how it could maintain 
its dolphin protection policy without contravening WTO rules. Although 
minute, this difference in approach should still be regarded as progre-
ss towards finding a balance between environmental protection and free 
trade. The next part will, however, analyse the possible changes in the 
overall approach to striking that balance which should be adopted in 
WTO dispute settlement.
5. Suggestions for a new approach
Although a slight shift in the approach in the WTO dispute settle-
ment is visible in US – Tuna II (Mexico), the case does not bring a major 
193 As required by Article III:1 of the GATT. 
194 Part 4.1 of this paper.
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change. In other words, the AB report does not introduce a new princi-
ple or substantial change to the already settled approach in addressing 
measures under the TBT. It especially does not adapt the analysis to the 
specific case of ‘green barriers’ to trade. After all, it is not hard to imagine 
that the AB’s ‘hint’ to the US on how to maintain its environmental policy 
is simply confined to the specific facts of the case. There is no guaran-
tee that future cases would have similar implications. Moreover, even in 
this case, the US did not manage to defend its dolphin protection policy 
as it stands today. Therefore, questions can be asked about what kind 
of approach should be adopted in order to make the WTO more friendly 
towards ‘green barriers’.
5.1. The ‘emergency’ approach
Zhao195 suggests a version of a balancing test between an envi-
ronmental measure and trade liberalisation. Basically, if the lack of a 
measure can lead to a serious consequence, such as the extinction of 
a species, environmental protection should prevail.196  In other words, 
Zhou suggests the application of an ‘emergency’ or ‘urgency’ criterion in 
the analysis. 
It is true that this suggestion was made in the context of Article XX of 
the GATT, but it should still be noted that something similar to an ‘emer-
gency’ criterion is actually already implemented in the TBT Agreement. 
Article 2.2 stipulates that the necessity test involves examining the risks 
non-fulfilment of a set objective (ie environmental protection) would crea-
te. Therefore, in the context of the TBT, the contribution of this approach 
is of little relevance. However, even in the context of the GATT, which 
does not provide such a provision, there are some further issues. To be 
more specific, it is difficult to define what an urgent measure actually is. 
Zhou gives an example of a measure which, if not implemented, would 
lead to the extinction of a species. This is far from satisfactory. First of 
all, such an approach requires extensive support in science and some-
times not even science can give a straightforward answer. For example, 
if measures which seek to rectify global warming were to be introduced, 
scientific evidence would be of little assistance as there is still no consen-
sus in scientific circles as to whether certain techniques would be able 
to reverse it.197 This, on the other hand, does not mean that the measure 
should not be allowed, especially if it does not create significantly adverse 
195 Y Zhao, ‘Environmental Protection vs Free Trade: A Quest for a More Balanced Approach 
within the WTO’ in K Van der Borght (ed), Essays on the Future of the WTO: Finding a New 
Balance (Cameron May 2003) 205, 223.
196 ibid.
197 UK Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (UK 
Royal Society Policy Document 10/09, September 2009).
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effects on trade liberalisation. Secondly, the application of such a crite-
rion sets the bar too low for many regulating countries. For example, the 
EU strongly endorses the application of the precautionary principle,198 
which entails regulation as early as when there is a risk that adverse 
effects for the environment might occur. It appears that a precautionary 
approach, to the extent that it involves a high level of environmental pro-
tection, is also in line with the WTO case law, since the AB in US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) acknowledged that a Member is allowed to achieve the legitimate 
objectives ‘at the level it considers appropriate’.199
Therefore, the application of an ‘emergency criterion’ would not con-
tribute to reconciling trade liberalisation and environmental protection 
in an appropriate manner, as it would result in opting for environmental 
protection only in exceptional cases.
5.2. The ‘limiting principles’ approach
Dunoff200 suggests the introduction of what he calls ‘limiting princi-
ples’ which aim to find a subtle balance between environmental protec-
tion and free trade. This involves examining (i) the type and strength of 
the environmental interest protected, (ii) whether there is discrimination 
between domestic and imported or among imported products, and (iii) 
whether the trade restriction is suitable and proportionate in achieving 
the environmental aim.201 Some of these elements, namely (ii) and (iii), are 
already present in the WTO jurisprudence. What is new in this approach 
is that it largely relies on scientific evidence to show the strength of the 
environmental interest202 and further entails a balancing exercise betwe-
en the risks for the environment and the costs for trade.203 However, the 
ultimate decision on which level of risk for the environment would be 
acceptable remains to be resolved by means of political decisions in the 
global community.204
Although the approach is quite elaborate, the crucial downside is 
the fact that the most important issue of deciding what is acceptable 
and what is not still remains in the political arena. It is quite obvious 
that a consensus in the global community on environmental protection, 
preferably including the adoption of various international instruments, 
would be ideal. However, this scenario is simply unrealistic. After all, not 
dealing with environmental issues at the international level is one of the 
198 Article 191 TFEU.
199 US – Tuna II (Mexico), AB Report (n 8) [316].
200 Dunoff (n 5)18-24.
201 ibid 19.
202 ibid 20.
203 ibid.
204 ibid.
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reasons why some Members tend to unilaterally adopt trade-restrictive 
environmental policies, which then creates litigation in the WTO. Solving 
the cause with the cause obviously cannot be the answer.
5.3. The ‘consistency approach’
The author of this paper suggests that a so-called ‘consistency 
approach’ should be adopted instead. Basically, the underlying postulate 
of this approach suggests that if a lack of protectionism of domestic pro-
ducts is demonstrated, then the environmental concerns should prevail. 
When it comes to the end result of a dispute, or, in other words, how a 
measure will be qualified in dispute settlement, simple logic tells us that 
there are only two sides of the coin – either it will be considered that the 
regulating country indeed wishes to protect the environment or that it is 
trying to conceal its protectionist intention behind its environmental po-
licies. Therefore, if the measure is not protectionist, then it must reflect 
genuine environmental concern and should thus be allowed. 
The question is then how the protectionist intent can be demonstra-
ted. This has been a cumbersome debate under the GATT for years205 but 
perhaps US – Tuna II (Mexico) and its particular TBT context can provi-
de some answers. As has been demonstrated in previous parts of this 
paper,206 the AB held that discrimination is present in the case at hand 
because the measure was not ‘calibrated’ to the risks for dolphins in all 
parts of the ocean. It was also demonstrated that discrimination does not 
follow from the lack of ‘calibration’. The author believes that the message 
the AB was trying to convey, but it did not have support in the text of 
the TBT Agreement, was that by de facto imposing stricter standards on 
Mexican vessels which fish in the ETP than on its own fleet which fishes 
outside the ETP, the US in fact acted in a protectionist manner and that 
is why its ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling system did not pass examination under 
the TBT. Therefore, the approach suggested here should consist of exa-
mining if there is consistency in the overall structure and application of 
the contested measure, ie if the measure poses an equal burden both on 
the domestic and on foreign market operators. After all, if the US wanted 
Mexico to replace its fishing techniques with those that are more dolphin-
friendly, it should have made the effort and ensured that indeed its own 
fleet bears the costs of protecting dolphins in all parts of the ocean. 
This ‘consistency approach’ would also be compatible with the 
approach based on a ‘legitimate regulatory purpose’ put forward by a 
205 A Mattoo, A Subramanian, ‘Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Di-
lemma and a Possible Resolution’ (1998) 1(2) JIEL 306.
206 Part 3.4 of this paper.
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number of academics.207 The notion of ‘consistency’ would facilitate the 
search for such a purpose in the examination of the disputed measures, 
as the fact that both domestic and foreign market operators are burdened 
excludes the possibility that there was a protectionist purpose behind 
the measures. The same criterion would also, at least indirectly, overrule 
measures which are not protectionist but are in fact irrational in other 
ways (eg not based on an actual threat for the environment). Knowing 
that such a measure could pass the scrutiny in WTO dispute settlement 
only if it burdens all market operators - including domestic ones - equally, 
it can be assumed that regulators would be reluctant to disadvantage the 
position of the products from their country just to achieve the same effect 
on foreign products and market operators. 
The author further asserts that even though this approach might 
already have been implicitly adopted by the AB in US – Tuna II (Mexico), 
it should be recognised as a matter of principle. Taken together with 
the ‘usual’ consideration on discrimination and necessity, the ‘consi-
stency test’ would create a number of benefits. On the one hand, the 
conflict between environmental concerns and trade liberalisation would 
be addressed more comprehensively in a balancing exercise that does not 
go to such lengths that would be inappropriate for a heterogeneous orga-
nisation like the WTO. On the other hand, the issue of protectionism as 
one of the greatest ‘enemies’ of free trade would be addressed in an open 
manner without endangering the genuine environmental policy objecti-
ves of regulating countries.
However, one question still remains unanswered and that is whether 
and how less developed countries, such as Mexico compared to the US, 
would be able to handle the additional costs the elevated environmen-
tal standards entail. Indeed, the suggested approach does not properly 
address the antagonism between ‘the rich and the poor’, but perhaps 
WTO dispute settlement is not an appropriate arena to do so.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine how the WTO tackles the very 
delicate problem of reconciling trade liberalisation and environmental 
protection. On the one hand, some countries are pushing for free trade in 
order to facilitate economic prosperity, while others, unsatisfied with the 
lack of response of the international community to environmental con-
cerns, introduce environmental regulation in the form of trade barriers. 
Such ‘green barriers’ are supposed to be aimed at genuinely protecting 
207 D Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose in GATT Article III, TBT Article 2.1, the Subsidies Agree-
ment, and Elsewhere: Hic et Ubique’ in G Van Calster and D Prévost (eds), Research 
Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 41-78. 
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the environment, but sometimes countries use them to conceal their pro-
tectionist intentions. Therefore, striking a balance between these intere-
sts is a delicate exercise, especially in a heterogeneous community like 
the WTO. Unfortunately for the environment, the WTO most often strikes 
that balance far from the equilibrium, almost completely opting for trade 
liberalisation.
The conflict between free trade and environmental protection in the 
WTO was examined on the basis of the most recent US – Tuna II (Mexico) 
ruling. This case serves as a perfect ground for analysis, not only becau-
se of its factual background, but also because it is the third one in the 
Tuna saga and as such it allows us to see possible progress in the WTO’s 
approach. 
The analysis has given ambiguous results. 
On the one hand, the overall outcome of US – Tuna II (Mexico) is un-
satisfactory, as once again a ‘green barrier’ did not manage to pass the 
WTO test. Furthermore, the Panel and the AB at times used reasoning for 
which it is hard to find a rationale, as, for example, regarding the distinc-
tion between a technical regulation and a standard. In addition, the ‘PPM 
debate’ seems to be completely sidelined in determining the ‘likeness’ of 
products.
On the other hand, it appears that the question of the extraterritori-
al application of unilaterally adopted policies has ceased to be an issue, 
including under the TBT Agreement. Of course, this does not mean that 
the Panel and the AB have unequivocally chosen environmental protecti-
on over free trade; they only gave the possibility for ‘green barriers’ to be 
allowed under the TBT as well.
In any event, certain progress is noticeable, especially in the 
approach taken by the AB in comparison to the Panel reports from the 
previous Tuna disputes. Even though its conclusion that the US gre-
en barrier treats foreign products less favourably than domestic ones is 
far from obeying the rules of proper legal reasoning, the AB managed to 
subtly give a ‘hint’ to the US on how it can remedy its contravention of 
the TBT. What is particularly striking in this observation is that if the US 
follows this suggestion, the situation would not result in more trade libe-
ralisation, but in fact a greater level of environmental protection. It can be 
concluded, or at least hoped, that the AB is slowly but surely shifting the 
approach in WTO dispute settlement closer to environmental protection.
The paper further examined another novelty brought by US – Tuna 
II (Mexico) and that is the use of the TBT Agreement instead of the GATT 
as the basis for analysis of the contested measures. On the one hand, the 
TBT in its structure and design has not proven to be more ‘environmen-
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tally friendly’ than the GATT. Given the heavier burden it places on the 
regulator, quite the contrary might be concluded. On the other hand, 
it has been shown that the TBT is able to address the issue of green 
barriers in a more comprehensive manner, avoiding some of the hurdles 
found in the GATT.
Still, if environmental protection and trade liberalisation are to be 
reconciled, the WTO should do more than simply hold on to the already 
used techniques. In that regard, the paper examined three suggestions 
on how the overall approach to the trade vs environment conflict should 
be changed.
However, regardless of which approach is chosen, the WTO and the 
broader international community will soon have to address this antago-
nism in the political arena. The GATT and the WTO were created mainly 
to facilitate trade and not to serve as a platform for (inter)national envi-
ronmental strategies. The pressure to respond to global environmental 
concerns is constantly growing and it is only a matter of time before it 
becomes impossible to ignore.
